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USIA FOR E, D/EE, D/R, CL AND EU

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: TSPL, PGOV, PINR, MARR, ECON, OREP, KSCA, UR
SUBJECT: SUPREME SOVIET INTEREST IN UNDERSTANDING
-- AMERICAN "CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE
- MILITARY": POSSIBLE VISIT OF A KEY SOVIET
- STAFFER?

REFS: (A) MOSCOW 19052 (B) MOSCOW 32684
- (C) MOSCOW 16245

1. (U) THIS CABLE REQUESTS DEPARTMENTAL ACTION: SEE
PARA 9.

2. (C) SUMMARY. IN WORK WITH CODELS SPRATT AND
ASPIN, WE HAVE IDENTIFIED A KEY CONTACT, NIKOLAY
KAPRANOV, DEALING WITH SOVIET DISARMAMENT ISSUES AND
SPECIFICALLY THE SUPREME SOVIET COMMITTEE ON DEFENSE
AND STATE SECURITY. ACADEMICIAN VELIKHOV, CHAIRMAN
OF THE ARMED FORCES SUB-COMMITTEE, HAS ASSIGNED
KAPRANOV THE FORMIDABLE TASK OF UNDERSTANDING AND
"BRINGING HOME FOR APPLICATION" THE MECHANISMS AND
PRINCIPLES WHICH THE U.S. CONGRESS USES TO EFFECT
CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY. FOR A WHILE, IT
APPEARED THIS EMBASSY WOULD, PERHAPS THROUGH A USIA
PROGRAM, HELP SUPPORT KAPRANOV'S WORK, AT HASO
INVITATION, FOR A PERIOD OF ABOUT A MONTH IN THE
CONGRESS. THAT EARLIER EFFORT FALTERED OVER
SCHEDULING PROBLEMS, BUT THE FUNDING OPTIONS NOW SEEM
EVEN BROADER THAN BEFORE. IN ADDITION, KAPRANOV HAS
RESOLVED HIS MAJOR SCHEDULING PROBLEMS. WE THEREFORE
ASK THE DEPARTMENT TO CHECK WHETHER CONGRESSIONAL
SUPPORT FOR SUCH AN IDEA -- PROVIDED FINANCIAL
SUPPORT COMES FROM SOMEWHERE ELSE -- STILL EXISTS.
IF SO, WE BELIEVE A PROGRAM, WITH EVENTUAL
FORMALIZATION THROUGH CONGRESS-TO-CONGRESS
COMMUNICATION, A VERY REAL AND DECIDEDLY WORTHWHILE
POSSIBILITY. END SUMMARY.

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2. (C) EMBASSY HAS REPORTED EARLIER ON NIKOLAY KAPRANOV, WHO FIRST APPEARED TO US AS "SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES" AND AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR THE "SCIENCE COUNCIL ON NATIONAL SECURITY, STRATEGIC BALANCE, AND ARMS CONTROL," A CREATION OF ACADEMICIAN VELIKHOV (REP A). WITH VELIKHOV'S GUIDANCE AND SUPPORT, KAPRANOV HAS BECOME ALSO AN ADVISOR AND KEY STAFFER FOR THE SUPREME SOVIET'S COMMITTEE ON DEFENSE AND STATE SECURITY. KAPRANOV WAS INVOLVED IN THE VISIT OF CODEL ASPIN IN AUGUST AND IS NOW A KEY CONTACT ON THE RETURN VISIT OF THE SOVIET COMMITTEE, EXPECTED IN FEBRUARY. WE BELIEVE THAT THE LEADERSHIP OF THE SUPREME SOVIET COMMITTEE ALSO INVOLVED KAPRANOV DIRECTLY IN THEIR DELIBERATIONS OVER LAPYGIN'S INVITATION TO HASC CHAIRMAN ASPIN TO CREATE A "JOINT LEGISLATIVE" VISIT TO THE VIENNA AND GENEVA NEGOTIATION SITES IN DECEMBER (REP B).

3. (C) AS WE REPORTED IN REP A, JUST BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF CODEL SPRATT FOR THE "BLACK SEA EXPERIMENT," KAPRANOV TOLD US THAT VELIKHOV HAD CHARGED HIM WITH STUDYING AND LEARNING "ALL THAT THERE IS TO KNOW" ABOUT HOW THE U.S. CONGRESS, AND SPECIFICALLY ITS COMMITTEES DEALING WITH THE U.S. MILITARY AND ARMS MATTERS, OPERATE. VELIKHOV'S GOAL, KAPRANOV TOLD US, IS TO COPY INTO THE SUPREME SOVIET THE AMERICAN ABILITY TO "EXERT CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY."

4. (C) WE WELCOMED KAPRANOV'S QUESTIONS, BUT URGED THAT HE TURN TO FAR MORE AUTHORITATIVE SOURCES: THE VISITING AMERICAN CONGRESSMEN FROM THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE. OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL DAYS OF THE CODEL SPRATT VISIT, MEMBERS OF THE CODEL NOT ONLY RESPONDED IN DETAIL TO KAPRANOV'S QUESTIONS, BUT ALSO DISCUSSED INFORMALLY A "MORE EFFECTIVE" WAY FOR KAPRANOV -- AND THUS VELIKHOV AND THE SUPREME SOVIET -- TO OBTAIN THAT REAL-WORLD UNDERSTANDING: TO HAVE KAPRANOV WORK DIRECTLY WITH THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE FOR A SHORT PERIOD, PERHAPS A MONTH.

5. (C) CONGRESSIONAL STAFFERS INFORMED US THAT, WHILE A COMMITTEE PROGRAM WAS A VERY REAL POSSIBILITY
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E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: TSPL, PGOV, PINR, MARR, ECON, OREP, KSCA, UR

SUBJECT: SUPREME SOVIET INTEREST IN UNDERSTANDING

-- ONE CONGRESSMAN WANTED KAPRANOV IN WASHINGTON BY EARLY SEPTEMBER -- THE CONGRESS ITSELF HAD NO ABILITY OR PROGRAM TO FUND KAPRANOV'S WORKING VISIT. WHILE WE WERE LOOKING AT VARIOUS PROGRAM OPTIONS, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF USIA-SPONSORED "INTERNATIONAL VISITORS' PROGRAM," SCHEDULING DIFFICULTIES AROSE. KAPRANOV, WHOSE SCHEDULE IS TIED TO SUPREME SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS, PROVED UNAVAILABLE FOR THE PERIOD THAT THE U.S. CONGRESS HAD PUSHED. WE COULD NOT PROGRAM HIM DURING HIS OWN NARROW WINDOW OF AVAILABILITY BECAUSE IT FELL ACROSS WHAT WOULD BE RECESS TIMES IN OUR CONGRESS; OUR CONGRESSIONAL CONTACTS INSISTED THAT THE BEST TIME FOR A KAPRANOV WORKING VISIT IS WHEN THE CONGRESS IS IN FULL SESSION.

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6. (C) THERE THE SITUATION RESTED UNTIL TWO UNRELATED EVENTS OCCURRED HERE TO RAISE AGAIN THE POSSIBILITY OF A WORKING VISIT. FIRST, WE HAVE LEARNED FROM KAPRANOV THAT THE SUPREME SOVIET LEADERSHIP (AND THUS HIS SUPERVISORS) BELIEVE THE TASK SUFFICIENTLY IMPORTANT THAT THEY WILL FREE HIM FROM OTHER OBLIGATIONS TO CARRY IT OUT; AND (B) WE HAVE LEARNED THAT OTHER AMERICAN SOURCES HAVE INFORMALLY EXPRESSED INTEREST IN FUNDING HIS WORKING VISIT THERE. THOSE GROUPS INCLUDE:

THE CARNEGIE CORPORATION OF NEW YORK; KEY CONTACT: FREDERICK A MOSHER, PROGRAM CHAIR, "AVOIDING A NUCLEAR WAR"; TELEPHONE (212) 371-3200; AND

AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS; KEY CONTACT: WILLIAM GREEN MILLER, PRESIDENT; TELEPHONE (202) 546-1700.

7. (U) WE HAVE NOT DIRECTLY CONTACTED A THIRD POSSIBLE SUPPORT MECHANISM, THAT UNDER THE NEW PROGRAM OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE (AAAS), BUT BELIEVE THAT AAAS PRESIDENT RICHARD ATKINSON, CHANCELLOR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT SAN DIEGO, KNOWS AT LEAST INDIRECTLY OF KAPRANOV AND OF THE POSSIBILITIES FOR THIS VISIT.

8. (C) IN SUM, THERE APPEARS TO BE BOTH TIME AND FUNDING AVAILABLE FOR HAVING KAPRANOV CARRY OUT THIS SEEMINGLY UNIQUE AND MUTUALLY-BENEFICIAL STUDY IN THE U.S. CONGRESS. THE QUESTION IS WHETHER THE TIMING, INTERESTS, AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE U.S. CONGRESS ARE SUCH THAT THIS EVENT CAN (OR SHOULD) COME TO PASS.

9. (C) WE REQUEST THE DEPARTMENT'S ASSISTANCE IN LEARNING WHETHER THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE WOULD BE INTERESTED/WILLING TO PROVIDE SPACE AND PROGRAM FOR KAPRANOV IF FUNDING CAN COME FROM OTHER SOURCES. ONCE WE KNOW UNDER WHAT, IF ANY, CONDITIONS THE COMMITTEE IS INTERESTED IN PURSUING SUCH A PROGRAM, WE CAN EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES WITH PROSPECTIVE SPONSOR(S).

10. (U) ALTHOUGH WE ARE PLEASED TO HELP THIS PROGRAM AT THIS STAGE, ONCE CONGRESSIONAL ACCEPTANCE AND SOUND FINANCING ARE ASSURED, WE BELIEVE THAT A DEPUTY IN THE SUPREME SOVIET COMMITTEE LEADERSHIP ITSELF WOULD WANT TO MAKE THE GESTURE OF A LETTER TO HIS AMERICAN COUNTERPART TO FORMALIZE THE ARRANGEMENT.

11. (U) LENINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

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END OF MESSAGE

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